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Abstract 
This dissertation sets its objective into the analyze of the data sharing with third parties 
and the guarantee of the data subject rights in the perspective of the Data Protection 
Regulation and the Directive 2016/680. In this analyzes the responsible for the data 
sharing will be a private company and the third parties, the competent authorities, in 
particular the judicial authorities. 
We will start by analyzing, in a comparative perspective, the rights in the regime of 
the Data Protection Regulation and the Directive 2016/608, in this context we will  
analyze the data sharing between private companies and the judicial authorities defining 
which law will regulate, and at what stage, this sharing. 
 Finally, we will analyze the point of confrontation of the two regimes in the scope of 
the rights, emphasizing the right of access and the fundamental role that it occupies in 
this problem. 
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Resumo 
A presente dissertação tem como objetivo a análise da partilha de dados com terceiros 
e a garantia dos direitos na perspectiva do Regulamento de Proteção de Dados e na 
Diretiva 2016/608. Nesta análise o responsável pela partilha de dados configura a figura 
da empresa privada e os terceiros, as autoridades competentes, em específico, as 
autoridades judiciais. 
Iremos começar por analisar, numa perspectiva comparada, os direitos no regime do 
Regulamento de Proteção de Dados e da Diretiva 2016/680, nesse âmbito vamos partir 
para a análise da partilha de dados entre as empresas privadas e as autoridades judicias 
definindo qual a lei que regula, e em que fase, esta partilha. 
 Por último, iremos analisar o ponto de confronto dos dois regimes no âmbito dos 
direitos desta partilha, dando ênfase ao direito de acesso e ao papel fundamental que 
ocupa nesta problemática.  
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Introduction 
We will dedicate our study into the comprehension of the data subject rights, regarding 
the processing of their personal data, under the scope of the main two important legal 
provisions of the European Union in this matter: the GDPR and the LED, particularly in 
the context of data sharing.  
First, we believe that has the most importance for our purpose to generally compare 
the data subject rights under both the GDPR and the LED, since this will allow us to 
understand their differences relatively to the protection of the data subject. 
Secondly, we will analyse and compare the automated processing of personal data, 
particularly the figure of profiling, and automated decisions understanding their 
differences and similarities in both regimes and the rights given to the data subject as well 
the legal obligations that falls into the controller. 
Thirdly, we will focus on analysing the legal background that allows these personal 
data sharing, between the responsible party and third parties, take place. We will consider 
for our study the responsible party being a private company and the third-party being law 
enforcement authorities. Private companies, in order to pursue their purpose, collect their 
user’s personal data, which translates in private companies having a high amount of 
personal data. For nowadays criminal investigations, this information collected by the 
private companies is of an extreme importance.  
Furthermore, we will study concerning these data sharing: the associated principles of 
law; we will define the different applicable laws in the different stages of the processing 
of the personal data and scrutinize the different purposes of each scope. 
To conclude, we will highlight the right of access and its practical application on the 
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1. The data subject rights scope of protection under the Directive and 
the GPDR –differences and why 
The GDPR and the Law Enforcement Directive (LED) both came to force on May 
2018 bringing with them a new change regarding data protection on the EU legal 
framework. 
The material scope of the GDPR is positive defined on Article 2(1)1 plus on Article 
2(2) we found the scope where this regulation does not apply 2. As for the material scope 
of the LED we can locate it on Article 2 of the LED. Furthermore, for the purpose of this 
studying is important to refer the Article 1 of the LED as it limits the purpose of this 
directive: 
(…)lays down the rules relating to the protection of natural persons with regard to the 
processing of personal data by competent authorities for the purposes of the prevention, 
investigation, detection or prosecution of criminal offences or the execution of criminal penalties, 
including the safeguarding against and the prevention of threats to public security. 
As we can observe on Recital 19 of the GDPR, that we will develop further in our 
present study, the GDPR itself also forwards the processing regarding the purposes of the 
prevention, investigation, detection or prosecution of criminal offences or the execution 
of criminal penalties to the LED.  
The GDPR and the LED are both defining the rules of processing personal data3, 
within different purposes, and each of them sets a range of rights regarding the figure of 
the data subject. 
 
1 Article 2(1): “This Regulation applies to the processing of personal data wholly or partly by automated 
means and to the processing other than by automated means of personal data which form part of a filing 
system or are intended to form part of a filing system.” 
2 Article 2(2) states: “This Regulation does not apply to the processing of personal data: (a)in the course of 
an activity which falls outside the scope of Union law; (b)by the Member States when carrying out activities 
which fall within the scope of Chapter 2 of Title V of the TEU; (c)by a natural person in the course of a 
purely personal or household activity; (d)by competent authorities for the purposes of the prevention, 
investigation, detection or prosecution of criminal offences or the execution of criminal penalties, including 
the safeguarding against and the prevention of threats to public security.”. 
3 Article 4 of the GDPR defines personal data as “(…) any information relating to an identified or 
identifiable natural person (‘data subject’); an identifiable natural person is one who can be identified, 
directly or indirectly, in particular by reference to an identifier such as a name, an identification number, 
location data, an online identifier or to one or more factors specific to the physical, physiological, genetic, 
mental, economic, cultural or social identity of that natural person;”. 
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The Chapter III of the GDPR, between Article 12 and Article 23 inclusive, defines the 
rights of the data subject4 regarding the processing of the individual’s data, as on the LED 
the data subject rights can be found on Chapter III between Article 12 and Article 18, 
inclusive5.  At this point we will analyse the general differences between both the GDPR 
and the LED on the subject’s data rights as well to understand the reason of these 
differences. The points 2.1 and 2.2 will further focus on the analyses of specifics articles 
in both the GDPR and the LED.  
The article 23 of the GDPR, alongside with the Recital 73, acknowledges the 
circumstances when the subject’s right can be restricted, however the restriction of the 
rights are under the conditions set in this Article6.  These rights can be restricted since 
they are not absolute rights7 however, there are principles to be respected when the 
limitation of the right occurs. DOMINIQUE MOORE explains that behind this Article 
23, we have to consider other EU provisions: 
(…) Article 52 (1) of the Charter8 accepts that limitations may be imposed on the 
exercise of the rights such as those set forth in Article 7 and 8 of the charter, as long as 
the limitations are provided by law, respect the essence of those rights and freedoms and, 
subject to the principle of proportionality , are necessary and genuinely meet objectives 
of general interest recognized by the European Union or the need to protect the rights 
and freedoms of others. 
The article 23(1) sets the conditions to that limitation/restriction: it has to respect the 
essence of the fundamental rights and freedoms; has to be a necessary and proportionate 
measure in a democratic society and has to safeguard the matters present between point 
(a) and (j) of this Article.  
 
4 The rights of the data subject present on Chapter III of the GDPR are the right of access; the right to 
rectification; the right to erasure; the right to restrict processing; the right to data portability; the right to 
object and the right not to be subject to a decision based solely on automated processing. 
5 The rights of the data subject present on Chapter III of the LED are the right to information, access, 
rectification, erasure or restriction of processing, 
6 DOMINIQUE MOORE explains that these conditions were inspired by the provisions on the Charter and 
in particular by Article 52. Commentary on the EU general data protection regulation (GDPR). A 
commentary, p.545 
7 As per DOMINIQUE MOORE “As the CJEU has underline, the right to the protection of personal data 
is not an absolute right, but must be considered in relation to its function in society.”. Op.cit., p.545 
8 Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union. 
 
   11 
Regarding the essence of the fundamental rights and freedoms CJEU has given in 
several occasions the opinion on this regarding privacy and data protection.9 
The Article 23(1) also establishes the how this limitation should take form “Union or 
Member State law to which the data controller or processor is subject may restrict by way 
of a legislative measure”.  
Turning our perspective to the LED, we do not find a general article defining a set of 
rules to restrict the data subject rights as we’ve found in the GDPR. In the LED we have 
the right’s restriction inside the norm that establishes the right10 or we can also find a 
single article restricting a single right11. 
As we’ve now concluded our overall view of the data subject rights in both the GDPR 
and the LED, we will continue our study focusing in a form of automated processing, 
profiling and the automated decisions that occur fruit of this processing.  
Personal data is intrinsically connected with profiling, as it will be used as the base to 
evaluate certain aspects related to a natural personal, and from that profile an automated 
decision will happen. This specific processing of personal data is extremely important 
either to a private company, or to law enforcement as it can, for example, establish a 
pattern. 
In this context, as we will further explain, the right that has an essential importance to 







9 As per DOMINIQUE MOORE the CJEU opined that“(…) (1) mass data retention did not affect the 
essence of the right to privacy under article 7 CFR, since it did not lead to knowledge of the contact of 
electronic communications; (2) mass data retention did not affect the essence of the right to data protection 
under article 8 CFR, since certain principles of data protection and data security had to be respected by 
providers of electronic communications service or of public communications networks; (3) legislation 
permitting public authorities to have access to electronic communications on a generalized basis 
compromise the essence of article 7;(…)” Op. cit., p.553.  
10 Article 13(3) of the LED. 
11 As example, Article 15 of the LED “Limitations to the right of access”. 
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1.1. Article 11 of the Directive and the Article 22 of the GDPR – 
Automated processing, including profiling, under both regimes, 
differences and similarities 
Automated processing and profiling are increasing exponentially alongside the 
advances of new technologies both in public and private sectors.12 This can be explained 
by a large percentage of the population holding a smartphone, a computer and for the 
proportional increase of internet connections that are done on a daily basis, which 
generates large amounts of data13. This data is collected for different reasons: data 
analyses allows companies to predict their users’ behaviours or preferences; for 
commercial purposes and others.  
PAUL DE HERT and HANS LAMMERANT define profile in a general way as “a set 
of characteristics, features and attributes with which a person or group can be discerned 
from another person our group”14”. In particular, these authors refer to a specific form of 
profiling describing it as: 
The form of profiling we have in mind is based on the use of Knowledge Discovery Databases 
(KDD, better known as data mining. The purpose of KDD is to find useful patterns in data, which 
can be gathered from different sources. The first stages of the process entail selecting and 
gathering data and preparing it for analyses. In the actual data mining data is analysed with the 
use of algorithms in order to discern patterns. (…) The final step consists in evaluating these 
patterns for their relevance. From these selected partners a profile can be derived.15 
 
12 As example: “Some of the sectors are banking and finance, healthcare, taxation, insurance, marketing 
and advertising are just a few examples of the fields where profiling is being carried out more regularly to 
aid decision-making.” Article 29 Data Protection Working Party (2018) Guidelines on Automated 
Individual Decision-making and Profiling for the Purposes of Regulation 2016/679, adopted on 3 October 
2017, as last revised and adopted on 6 February 2018, p. 5.  
13 NIŠEVIC, Maja – “Profiling Consumers Through Big Data Analytics: Strengths and Weaknesses of 
Article 22 GDPR”, Global Privacy Law Review, Issue 2, (2020),  pp. 104-115, 
https://kluwerlawonline.com/journalarticle/Global+Privacy+Law+Review/1.2/GPLR2020082.  
14 LAMMERANT, H. and DE HERT, P. – “Predictive profiling and its legal limits: Effectiveness gone 
forever.”, Exploring the boundaries of big data, Vol. 32, (2016), p. 145. 
15 Op. cit., p. 145. 
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Also, Article 4 (4) of the GDPR brings us the definition of profiling16, while the Article 
22 establishes the scope of protection17 of the data subject when is subject to automated 
processing, including profiling and therefore, as a result, an automated decision can occur.  
We believe it is pertinent to briefly point to the wording present on both articles 
regarding automated process, as we observe a slight difference.  Article 4(4) of the GDPR 
refers to “any form of automated processing” as Article 22 of the GDPR refers to “solely 
on automated processing”18.  Even though that profiling requires automated processing, 
a human involvement during the process does not remove the activity out of the 
definition19.  
As we move now to the scope of the LED, we can observe on Article 3(4) that profiling 
is defined using the exact wording as on the GDPR on Article 4(4). As starting to analyse 
in parallel the Article 11 of the LED with the Article 22 of the GDPR, we encounter a 
different wording as well what seems a different protection of the data subject right on 
this matter. The Article 11 of the LED on its number (1) sets a clear prohibition:  
 
16 Article 4(4) of the GDPR “ ‘profiling’ means any form of automated processing of personal data 
consisting of the use of personal data to evaluate certain personal aspects relating to a natural person, in 
particular to analyse or predict aspects concerning that natural person's performance at work, economic 
situation, health, personal preferences, interests, reliability, behaviour, location or movements;”. 
17 To this point is important to mention that regarding the need of protection of the individual’s rights on 
such cases “(…) profiling and automated decision-making can pose significant risks for individuals’ rights 
and freedoms which require appropriate safeguards.”. Article 29 Data Protection Working Party (2017) 
Opinion on Some Key Issues of the Law Enforcement Directive (EU 2016/680), adopted on 29 November 
2017, p.11. 
18 Solely automated processing translates to no human involvement on the processing. However, the criteria 
for human involvement as given on by Article 29 Data Protection Working Party (2018) “To qualify as 
human involvement, the controller must ensure that any oversight of the decision is meaningful, rather than 
just a token gesture. It should be carried out by someone who has the authority and competence to change 
the decision” means that has to be a significant involvement of the human factor, significant to the point to 
change de decision. Otherwise if insignificant human involvement in the automated processing was 
considered, the controller could fabricate this involvement in order to avoid the application of the Article 
22 of the GDPR. See, Article 29 Data Protection Working Party (2018) Guidelines on Automated Individual 
Decision-making and Profiling for the Purposes of Regulation 2016/679, adopted on 3 October 2017, as 
last revised and adopted on 6 February 2018, p. 21 
19 Article 29 Data Protection Working Party (2018) Guidelines on Automated Individual Decision-making 
and Profiling for the Purposes of Regulation 2016/679, adopted on 3 October 2017, as last revised and 
adopted on 6 February 2018, p. 7. 
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1. Member States shall provide for a decision based solely on automated processing, 
including profiling, which produces an adverse legal effect concerning the data subject or 
significantly affects him or her, to be prohibited (…). 
As, on the contrary, the Article 22 (1) of the GDPR mentions a right as follows: 
 The data subject shall have the right not to be subject to a decision based solely on automated 
processing, including profiling, which produces legal effects concerning him or her or similarly 
significantly affects him or her. 
Initially, this can give the impression that comparatively speaking the Article 11 sets 
a stronger protection, as it mentions a  clear prohibition, as Article 22 sets it as a right that 
can lead to the interpretation that has to be invoked by the data subject to trigger the article 
application.20   
Although the Article 22(1) of the GDPR states that “The data subject shall have the 
right (…)”, the WP29, on the 2018 Guidelines, advises that this article should be 
interpreted as a general prohibition and not as a right to be invoked by the data subject. 
The WP29 raises several rational and legal justifications to defend Article 22(1) as a 
prohibition: although Article 22 is under Chapter III of the GDPR21, not all of the rights 
present on this chapter are rights that have to see an active exercise to be applied, Articles 
13 and 14 are passive rights as are rights that fall under the obligation of the controller to 
fulfil and not on the data subject22; if the Article 22 was a right to be invoked by the data 
subject, then the article 22(2)(c) would be conflicting and inconsistent as it states “is 
based on the data subject's explicit consent”, however is not possible for the data subject 
to both consent and object in the same processing. 
LEE A. BYGRAVE also shares the opinion that the fact that Article 22 is placed on 
Chapter III, doesn´t necessarily define it as direct subject data right as Articles 13 and 14, 
both in Chapter III, cast this as a duty on the controller, not as a right to invoke by the 
data subject. Also, the author brings to the discussing the fact that this “prohibition-issue” 
should be analyse under the requirements that the GDPR states on fully automated 
decisional systems that involve systematic and extensive evaluation of data subjects”. The 
 
20 On the analyse of LEE A. BYGRAVE “(…) Article 11 (1) LED is clearly expressed as a qualified 
prohibition (…)”. Commentary on the EU general data protection regulation (GDPR). A commentary, p. 
539. 
21 The Chapter III of the GDPR as mention above, states the data subject rights. 
22 Articles 15-18 and Articles 20-21 are rights where it falls into the data subject spectrum to active exercise 
its rights. 
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GDPR sets as a requirement that these systems have to be submitted to a “data protection 
impact assessment (DPIA) previously, and therefore the author concludes that this rule 
satisfies the control function of a qualified prohibition.23 
Another difference found in the wording of both Article 11(1) of the LED and Article 
22(1) of the GDPR is regarding the nature of the legal effects produced on the data 
subject. Article 11(1) states a prohibition only when “adverse legal effects”24 or when 
there is a “significantly affect”25 are produced as the Article 22(1) only mentions “legal 
effects” or “similarly significantly”. Here we can acknowledge that the GDPR has a 
boarder scope of application than the LED. 
In the GDPR, this prohibition can be overcome if one of the exceptions is verified. The 
Article 22 (2) of the GDPR enumerates three exceptions to this right as follows: 
(a)  is necessary for entering into, or performance of, a contract between the data subject 
and a data controller; 
(b) is authorised by Union or Member State law to which the controller is subject and which 
also lays down suitable measures to safeguard the data subject's rights and freedoms and 
legitimate interests; or 
(c) is based on the data subject's explicit consent. 
For processing on the basis of the Article 22 (a) and (c) the GDPR establishes on 
Article 22 (3) that the controllers have to “implement suitable measures to safeguard the 
data subject's rights and freedoms and legitimate interests, at least the right to obtain 
human intervention on the part of the controller, to express his or her point of view and 
to contest the decision.”. Article 22 (2) (b) also establishes that the Union or Member 
state law that authorizes such process has to include “suitable measures to safeguard the 
data subject's rights and freedoms and legitimate interests”.  
We can conclude that the data subject, both on Article 22 (1) and Article 22 (3) has 
therefore always a right to a human intervention, when concerning the reviewing of a 
 
23 Op. cit., p. 531. 
24 “A typical adverse effect resulting from automated decisions could be the application of increased 
security measures or surveillance by the competent authorities.” Article 29 Data Protection Working Party 
(2017) Opinion on some key issues of the Law Enforcement Directive (EU 2016/680) Adopted on 29 
November 2017, p.12. 
25 “(…) as for example in the case where a passenger is not allowed on board because registered in a black 
list, thereby expanding the scope of Article 11.” Article 29 Data Protection Working Party (2017) Opinion 
on some key issues of the Law Enforcement Directive (EU 2016/680) Adopted on 29 November 2017, p.12. 
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fully automated decision, this right as the author LEE A. BYGRAVE states is exercised 
ex post.26 
Article 11 of the LED do not establish any of the exceptions to the prohibition as article 
22 (2) does, due to the purpose of processing under the scope of LED, explicit consent of 
the data subject or contractual purposes would not be possible under the LED as there is 
a “(…) clear imbalance of powers between the data subject and the controller(…).”27 
Although the Article 11 of the LED has we have seen does not refer to any specific 
exception to this prohibition, on the last part of paragraph one, we find a exception based 
on either a law issued by the Member State where the controller is based, or authorized 
by the Union, that has to provide appropriate safeguards for the rights and freedoms of 
the data subject, as we’ve analyse in Article 22 (3), and additionally mentioning that at 
least there has to be the right to obtain human involvement on the controller part. 
In Article 11 (1) of the LED we observe that is clearly missing the provision present 
on Article 22 that allows the data subject “to express his or her point of view and to 
contest the decision”. The Recital 38 of the LED, however, mentions this provision: 
(…)In any case, such processing should be subject to suitable safeguards, including the 
provision of specific information to the data subject and the right to obtain human intervention, 
in particular to express his or her point of view, to obtain an explanation of the decision reached 
after such assessment or to challenge the decision.(…) 
We can conclude that, contrary to the GDPR, these ex post safeguards are not required 
under the LED, nevertheless, the Member States when transposing the directive to their 
national jurisdiction can provide to the data subject a higher level of protection as Recital 
15 and Article 1 (3) states.28 
Analysing now the special categories of personal data, defined in Article 10 of the 
LED,  Article 11(2) of the LED only allows decisions, as the ones mention in paragraph 
1, in the situation when the Member State has adopted “suitable measures to safeguard 
the data subject's rights and freedoms and legitimate interests are in place.” The paragraph 
 
26 Op. cit., p. 538. 
27 Article 29 Data Protection Working Party (2017) Opinion on some key issues of the Law Enforcement 
Directive (EU 2016/680) Adopted on 29 November 2017, p.12. 
28 LYNSKEY, O. – “Criminal justice profiling and EU data protection law: Precarious protection from 
predictive policing.” International Journal of Law in Context, 15(2), (2019), 162-176.  
 
   17 
3 of the Article 11 is in accordance with the EU antidiscrimination law prohibiting 
profiling that will result in discrimination of individual’s mention on Article 10.  
Since this is extremely sensitive data, WP29, 2017 has reiterated the importance of the 
Member State to adopt rigorous safeguard measures when transposing the Directive, 
mentioning that when processing that specific data, there is the obvious existence of risks 
that can lead to discrimination.29 
On the first part of Article 22(4) we encounter a qualified prohibition regarding 
automated decisions, as previously mention on Article 22(2), when that decisions are 
constructed upon processing of sensitive data as referred on Article 9(1).  The author LEE 
A. BYGRAVE points that the prohibition mentions paragraph 2, instead of paragraph 1 
of the Article 22, in order to highlight that the “prohibition takes precedence over the 
exception”30. 
 Focusing now on the last part of Article 22(4), we can observe a derogation to this 
prohibition divided between the provisions present on Article 9(2)(a) and Article 9(2)(g), 
that allows the processing of this special categories data upon explicitly consent of the 
data subject, situation as we´ve already developed above is not possible under the LED, 
or in the case of substantial public interest, and in such case the domestic law: 
 has to be proportionate to the aim pursued, respect the essence of the right to data protection 
and provide for suitable and specific measures to safeguard the fundamental rights and the 







29 Op. cit., p.13. 
30 Op. cit., p.539. 
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1.2. Limitations of the right of access by the data subject under the 
Directive. Analysis of articles 14 ,15 and 16 of the Directive 
The right of access is set as a general rule under Article 14 of the LED, the Member 
States therefore, must provide first to the data subjects the right to obtain the confirmation 
whether their data is being processed and access to the personal data that is being 
processed from the controller.31 When this communication happens, Article 12(1) of the 
LED obliges the controller to provide this information “(…) in a concise, intelligible and 
easily accessible form, using clear and plain language.(…)”.  
Related to our present study, the Article 14(g) establishes that when the right of access 
is fully fulfilled, the controller has not only to communicate the personal data under 
processing but also the origin of this data. The WP29, 2017 advises that additionally, if 
possible, “(…) the purposes for which the data were transmitted (…)” should be part of 
this communication from the controller to the data subject.  
The limitations to the right of access are set on Article 15 of the LED: these limitations 
can be fully or partially;  the duration of these limitations are not clearly establish as they 
have to be adopted case by case, however the article defines that “(…)for as long as such 
a partial or complete restriction constitutes a necessary and proportionate measure in a 
democratic society(…). Once the exercise of the right of access no longer represents 
liability for the investigation in place, the right of access is restored again. The article 15 
does not set any specific time frame for the restriction, however by the interpretation of 
the word of law, this restriction should not be definitive. The data subject that would 
receive this information, as the purpose is the prevention, investigation, detection or 
prosecution of criminal offences or the execution of criminal penalties, should be part of 
the criminal procedure and qualify as witnesses, victims, persons of interest, experts, 
convicts and suspects. 
If no communication will take place from the controller to the data subject, and 
therefore the restriction on Article 15(1) applies, the concept of “neither confirm nor 
deny” can be applied, especially in the cases that the act to inform the data subject of the 
 
31 Article 29 Data Protection Working Party (2017) Opinion on some key issues of the Law Enforcement 
Directive (EU 2016/680) Adopted on 29 November 2017, p.19. 
 
 
   19 
refusal or restriction undermine a purpose under paragraph 1, as per Article 15(3). This 
response leaves the data subject on a blank space and is expected that can result in 
frustration on the data subject side. On this case, the WP29, 2017 advises, in accordance 
with the last part of Article 15(3) , that the data subject has to be provided with 
information regarding the right to submit a complaint with the supervisory authority, the 
contact details of this DPA or presented with the option to pursue a judicial remedy. Here 
we can conclude that the Law Enforcement Authorities can either directly deal with the 
data subject request or indirectly, by Member States enforcing “(…) their supervision 
authorities to exercise data subject rights in case a controller decides to limit them.”32 
To complement this disposition, Article 15(4) states that Member States have to “(…) 
provide for the controller to document the factual or legal reasons on which the decision 
is based. That information shall be made available to the supervisory authorities.” 
The right to rectification or erasure of personal data and restriction of processing 
under Article 16, is an extremely important provision. 
 Analysing the rectification aspect, this importance is explained by the fact that if 
inexact data, especially when relating to facts33, is being processed by the controller, 
adverse legal effects can occur for the data subject.  
This said, a necessity raises to process, as urgent as possible, the founded requests to 
rectify data.34 
The erasure of data is allowed by the article 16(2) when the processing of the data 
disobeys the LED as stated in Recital 47. The domestic legislation has to provide this 
right of erasure in the following situations as mention in the article: when it violates  the 
principles of processing as in Article 4; when is unlawful, Article 8;  when it violates the 
provision regarding special categories of personal data present in Article 10 and  where 
personal data must be erased in order to comply with a legal obligation to which the 
controller is subject.  
 
32 SAJFERT, Juraj and QUINTEL, Teresa – “Data Protection Directive (EU) 2016/680 for Police and 
Criminal Justice Authorities” (December 1, 2017). Cole/Boehm GDPR Commentary, Edward Elgar 
Publishing, 2019, Forthcoming. 
33 As specified in Recital 47 of the LED. 
34 The WP29 advises that this requests with the purpose to rectify data should be done within a month. 
Article 29 Data Protection Working Party (2017) Opinion on some key issues of the Law Enforcement 
Directive (EU 2016/680) Adopted on 29 November 2017, p.21. 
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The WP29, 2017 points, the importance for the domestic legislators as well the 
controllers to do not interpretate the provisions enumerate on Article 16(2) as exhaustive 
and to do an interpretation of the article, alongside the core of the right defined in the 
Recital 47.35 
There are however, two situations outlined by Article 16(3) when instead to erasure 
the data, the controller can restrict the processing of the data: 
(a) the accuracy of the personal data is contested by the data subject and their accuracy or 
inaccuracy cannot be ascertained; or 
(b) the personal data must be maintained for the purposes of evidence. 
We find pertinent to briefly mention the difference between the GDPR and the LED 
regarding the right to rectification and erasure. In the LED, as we have seen, these two 
rights are combined in one single provision, in Article 16. However, in the GDPR we find 
these rights allocated to different articles, as Article 17 is dedicated solely to the right to 
erasure (‘right to be forgotten’) and Article 18 sets the provision for the right to 
restriction of processing. 
Overall, these rights represent a strong shield of protection to the data subject 
regarding the processing of his/her personal data. The legislator is aware of the impact of 
this information on the individual’s core, especially since we are in the scope of 
prevention, investigation, detection or prosecution of criminal offences or the execution 
of criminal penalties, and established safeguards and mechanisms to be used even if the 
right is restricted, for example as we mention  the possibility to submit a complaint with 
the supervisory authority when the right of access is restricted.  
On the next point we will enter into the data sharing between a private company and a 
law enforcement authority. Since its personal data that will be the content of this 
transmission, we will understand how the data subject rights are affected, specially the 





35 Op. cit., p. 21. 
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2. The data subject rights and data sharing between private 
companies and competent authorities 
On a private company perspective, the data subject personal data that is collected36 and 
therefore processed for commercial purposes falls under the material scope of the 
GDPR37. Focusing on a more “Silicon Valley” company perspective, high-tech 
companies such as Google, Facebook or Uber collect a huge amount of the user’s data, 
not only but also, to be able to provide a personalize service to the user and to allow their 
platforms to maximize the user experience accordingly with the applicable privacy laws. 
These companies in order to collect the referred amount of data, have tools and resources 
that are not normally available to the common companies or even public institutions and 
organizations, such as Law Enforcement authorities.  
Therefore, is not a surprise that Law Enforcement authorities all over the world would 
eventually understand the value of these companies and start to request data to them when 
pursuing a criminal investigation38 when that data would be useful to identify the 
individual in question.   
If we take a close look in the transparency reports of these high-tech companies39 we 
can see an exponentially increase on this numbers, year by year.  This shows us that 
official government authorities are using these platforms as tools to conduct their criminal 
investigations, they acknowledge their own limitations on this subject and make the smart 
move to take use of the high amount of data held by these companies creating this new 
reality between a private and a public figure inside the criminal investigation scene. 
 
36 The Article 4(2) of the GDPR defines processing as “(…) means any operation or set of operations which 
is performed on personal data or on sets of personal data, whether or not by automated means, such as 
collection, recording, organization, structuring, storage, adaptation or alteration, retrieval, consultation, use, 
disclosure by transmission, dissemination or otherwise making available, alignment or combination, 
restriction, erasure or destruction.”. 
37 In the words of HERKE KRANENBORG “The first paragraph of Article 2 positively formulates what is 
covered by the GDPR: the processing of personal data wholly or partly by automated means and other than 
by automated means when the personal data form part of a filling system are intended to form part of such 
a system. Article 2 does not differentiate between the public and private sectors”, Commentary on the EU 
general data protection regulation (GDPR). A commentary, p.63. 
38 JASSERAND, Catherine – “Law enforcement access to personal data originally collected by private 
parties: Missing data subjects' safeguards in directive 2016/680?”, Computer Law & Security Review 
Volume 34, Issue 1, February 2018, pp. 154-155. 
39 Facebook  has reported that between January 2019 and June 2019 more than 140,000 government 
requests for the disclosure of user’s data based on a criminal request have been made, see 
https://transparency.facebook.com/government-data-requests/jul-dec-2019. 
 
   22 
One of the questions that raised among us was which are the applicable laws when law 
enforcement authorities or competent authorities access data that initially was collected 
for a different purpose, a non-criminal purpose.  
The GDPR excludes itself for the regulation of processing of personal data by 
competent authorities for prevention, investigation, detection or prosecution of criminal 
offences40, in the other hand the LED on the Article 2 (2) enforces positively this 
regulation and shares with the GDPR, as per HERKE KRANENBORG, the same 
definition of “personal data”, “processing” and “filling”41/42. We can so far establish that 
when the data is initially collected by a private company the initial purpose falls under 
the material scope of the GDPR and therefore the processing of that data will be regulated 
by the GDPR. When the data sharing happens, this transmission is still regulated by the 
GDPR. 
After the data transmission, when the same data is being further processed by 
competent authorities43 for the prevention, investigation, detection or prosecution of 
criminal offences, the purpose changes and it falls under the scope of the LED, at this 
stage that data is now subject to the rules of the LED. 44   
The recital 19 of the GDPR clearly forwards to the LED the regulation of the data 
when is being processed for the “(…) purposes of the prevention, investigation, detection 
or prosecution of criminal offences or the execution of criminal penalties, including the 
safeguarding against and the prevention of threats to public security (…)”. The same 
recital also establishes that a Member State can entrust a competent authority, as per the 
definition on the Article 3 (7) of the LED, with a duty that not falls under the above 
purpose for processing of personal data and that falls within the scope of the GDPR. 
 
40 Article 2(2)(d) of the GDPR. 
41 KUNER, C., BYGRAVE, L. A., & DOCKSEY, C. Commentary on the EU general data protection 
regulation (GDPR). A commentary. Kettering, Oxford University Press, (2019), p.7. 
42 The definition of “filing” can be found on Article 6 of the GDPR. 
43 LED has succeeded to define competent authorities on the Article 3 (7) as: “competent authority means: 
(a)any public authority competent for the prevention, investigation, detection or prosecution of criminal 
offences or the execution of criminal penalties, including the safeguarding against and the prevention of 
threats to public security; or (b )any other body or entity entrusted by Member State law to exercise public 
authority and public powers for the purposes of the prevention, investigation, detection or prosecution of 
criminal offences or the execution of criminal penalties, including the safeguarding against and the 
prevention of threats to public security”. 
44 JASSERAND, Catherine – “Law enforcement access to personal data originally collected by private 
parties: Missing data subjects' safeguards in directive 2016/680?”, Computer Law & Security Review 
Volume 34, Issue 1, February 2018, p. 157. 
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The Recital 11 of the LED confirms the Recital 19 of the GDPR and forwards to the 
GDPR the cases where the Member state entrust a body or an entity – not a competent 
authority – to collect personal data and further processing for the purposes of 
investigation detection or prosecution of criminal offences in order to comply with a legal 
obligation.45 
As we´ve seen, both the GDPR and the LED regulate this data however, in different 
stages of the processing. The GDPR in the initial moment when the data is being collected 
by a private company for a non-criminal purpose and the further processing of that data 
for the purposes of investigation detection or prosecution of criminal offences falls on the 
scope of the LED. 
It´s also important to acknowledge and mention at this point a pertinent perspective on 
the legal background of the Article 2 of the GDPR.  
 On this HERKE KRANENBORG46 compares the Article 3 of the DPD with the 
Article 2 of the GDPR concluding that they share in a large part the same positive 
formulation however in the exclusions, we can spot a big difference. That big difference 
is that the Article 2 of the GDPR mentions a specific set of rules regarding the law 
enforcement authorities and no longer broadly states, as the Article 3 of the DPD 
previously did, to “activities of the state in areas of criminal law”. Also, as we mention 
before, the GDPR uniforms this exclusion of the LED scope not only with the Article 2 
but also in the Recital 19. With this said, HERKE KRANENBORG states that there is 
more clarity now “(…) as to whether private entities are covered by the GDPR when they 




45 The Recital 11 of the LED gives the example of the financial institutions : “(…) for the purposes of 
investigation detection or prosecution of criminal offences financial institutions retain certain personal data 
which are processed by them, and provide those personal data only to the competent national authorities in 
specific cases and in accordance with Member State law.”. 
46 Op. cit., p.64. 
47 As an example, for the author, the PNR cases that were found outside the scope of the DPD by the CJEU, 
now would be considered to be covered by the GDPR, as the GDPR on the Article 2(2)(d) excludes itself 
only when the data is being processed by the competent authorities. In addition is pertinent to mention that 
the PNR cases have a specific regulation with the Directive (EU) 2016/681. 
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2.1. The new so-called Law Enforcement Response Teams 
Now that we have understood the role of the GDPR and the LED on the process of 
data sharing, the other question that imposes itself is – how do this high-tech companies 
comply and response to this data requests? 
 As we can see on the transparency report done by Facebook, the data requests coming 
from competent authorities on a criminal basis are increasing exponentially year by year. 
Since this high-tech companies hold a great amount of data, not complying with these 
requests would not only depreciate the public image of these companies but also create 
tension between the national regulator of the respective service48. 
However, lawful principals as legality, proportionality, territoriality, necessity and 
complying with the applicable legal framework of each country have to be taken in 
account when complying with these legal data requests. This compliance demands a big 
change of operations for these companies. 
EU based private companies such as Facebook, Uber, Booking, Twitter among many 
others, felt the necessity to create the conditions to comply to these requests and from that 
necessity resulted the creation of specialized teams known in general as Law Enforcement 
Response Teams. 
To prevent a personal data breach49 on these processes of data sharing, these 
companies created, as a first step, special interfaces50 to ensure the legality and the 
legitimacy of the source of the requests. It is important to emphasize that these teams 
have the important mission to be the keepers of the “gate” regarding their user’s privacy. 
Upon receipt of a data request from competent authorities there are a few principals to be 
 
48 On this matter is pertinent to mention that the car-sharing platform Uber, has a long dispute with the 
Transport for London to keep operating since their arrival to London. Since 2012 the car-sharing platform 
had to comply with different measures to keep their license. The most recent favorable decision, after the 
decision on November 2019, arrived this year with the approval of the license renewal. Two of the factors, 
among several, that contribute to this decision was the response to the data requests coming from the British 
Police and Metropolitan Police and the proactive reports that Uber continually does to Transport for London 
regarding on-platform safety incidents. As seen on different news websites such as:  
https://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-8746659/Police-Ubers-licence-bid-taxi-firm-shares-data-
intelligence-officers.html; https://www.thetimes.co.uk/article/uber-gives-police-private-data-on-drivers-
and-passengers-dm7l3gsxv and also accordingly to internal statements on https://www.uber.com/en-
GB/blog/how-uber-in-london-works-with-the-metropolitan-police/.  
49 Article 4(12) of the. GDPR defines personal data breach as “‘(…) a breach of security leading to the 
accidental or unlawful destruction, loss, alteration, unauthorized disclosure of, or access to, personal data 
transmitted, stored or otherwise processed;” 
50 As example, the Uber law enforcement portal on https://lert.uber.com/s/?language=en_US; also 
Facebook as a similar portal that can be access on https://www.facebook.com/records/login/.  
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balanced on the equation between the data requested and the data shared, one of them is 
the proportionality principal. The proportionality principle, a universal and transversal 
principle to both national and EU legislation, present in national constitutional laws and 
EU treaties, is one of the most important principals of the EU51/52. As per the ECJ,53 this 
principal is a general principle of law, the general qualification results that the 
proportionality principle can be applied to an indefinite number of law cases, 
distinguishing itself from a principle of law.54 We can observe three basic criteria 
concerning the proportionality principle: suitability, necessity and proportionality sensu 
stricto. 55 
The suitability criteria, applying now this analysis to our present study, would be the 
relation between the data shared and the intended objective. As a first step, it is the 
essential to establish a relation between the data to be shared and acknowledge if that data 
will fulfill the intended objective, as in our study case, a criminal investigation.  This is 
aligned with the provision present on Article 5(1)(c), as it states that the personal data as 
to be “adequate, relevant and limited to what is necessary in relation to the purposes for 
which they are processed (‘data minimisation’);”. If the data is not adequate, relevant to 
fulfil the purpose of the processing, the suitability criteria will not be fulfilled.  
The necessity criteria applied to our study, translates to understand if the data that has 
been requested is necessary for the purpose to conduct the criminal investigation in 
question. The final exercise is to acknowledge the nature of the crime on the bases of the 
data request versus the data that is being requested. On the proportionality sensu stricto 
we conduct a balance between the intrusion on the individual’s personal data, and sub 
consequent damages that can result on her/her spectrum of rights, and the benefit of that 
data to the criminal investigation. We will give hypothetical examples concerning these 
criteria to comprehend how they are applied in the practical sense. 
 
51 This principle has been adopted in EU institutions such as the European Court of Human Rights and the 
European Court of Justice. 
52 The proportionality principle is present on the Treaty on European Union on Article 5(3) and (4). 
53 The ECJ has stated in many cases the proportionality principal as a general principal of law. See as an 
example case 265/87, Hermann SchraderHS Kraftfutter GmbH & Co. KG v Haupt- zollamt Gronau [1989] 
ECR 2237, 521. 
54 HARBO, T.‐I. – “The Function of the Proportionality Principle in EU Law”, European Law Journal, 16, 
(2010), p. 165. 
55 MALISZEWSKA-NIENARTOWICZ, Justyna – "The Principle of Proportionality in the European 
Community Law- General Characteristic and Practical Application," Pravni Vjesnik 24, no. 1 (2008), p.91.  
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It would be extremely invasive in the user’s data to share more than the minimum 
necessary data to identify the user in a crime for example of theft56. The minimum 
personal data57 that can identify a user can be from name, telephone number, email 
address, identification number, to an IP registration number.  In the other hand, there is 
data that is considered more invasive in the privacy spectrum of the user, due to its nature, 
such as biometric data58 and GPS location and therefore demands another proportionality 
exercise when shared. As we´ve said, these teams are also the “gate” keepers of their 
company’s user’s privacy, they have the legal responsibility to balance the proportionality 
of data shared and data requested.  
As a practical example: Law Enforcement is requesting data to a taxi car-sharing 
company on the basis of a criminal request where the purpose is the prevention of a crime 
inside the terrorism scope. Law enforcement requests GPS location of the trips of a user, 
that in this hypothetical scenario is signalized by Law Enforcement as a possible member 
of a terrorist organization, for the period of six months in order to assess his movements 
and identify possible addresses of interest with the goal to capture the subject. In this 
example the sharing of six months worthy of GPS data is proportional as law enforcement 
is trying to establish a pattern of the movements of the user for a specific time frame and 
also the serious suspicion, of the subject to be part of a terrorist organization represents a 
threat to the public safety. Also, the necessity element is in place as without that specific 
that law enforcement couldn´t establish the movements of the user in question, therefore 
the data is necessary to the investigation. 
In other hypothetical example, if Law Enforcement requests to the taxi car-sharing 
company six months of GPS location regarding a user suspect of a simple theft that 
occurred on a specific day and location, in a first analyses it seems the data requested is 
not proportionable and in such case to protect a unjustified privacy invasion, these teams 
 
56 Example of the principle of prohibition of excess. 
57 Article 4(1) of the GDPR defines personal data in a broad way “ ‘personal data’ means any information 
relating to an identified or identifiable natural person (‘data subject’); an identifiable natural person is one 
who can be identified, directly or indirectly, in particular by reference to an identifier such as a name, an 
identification number, location data, an online identifier or to one or more factors specific to the physical, 
physiological, genetic, mental, economic, cultural or social identity of that natural person;(…)”. 
58 Article 4(14) of the GDPR defines it as “(…) personal data resulting from specific technical processing 
relating to the physical, physiological or behavioural characteristics of a natural person, which allow or 
confirm the unique identification of that natural person, such as facial images or dactyloscopy data;” and 
Article 9 of the GDPR includes it on special categories of personal data. 
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may proactively narrow down the amount of information shared based on principals of 
proportionality and necessity. 
Additionally, to this exercise of balancing the level of intrusion on the user’s data 
privacy, other legal requirements have to be considered when sharing the data upon the 
receipt of a legal data request. As the GDPR is a regulation that has been adopted in the 
national legal framework by each EU Member State59, national legal requirements have 
also to be taken in consideration when sharing the data: the national law of the country 
where the data controller is based60; the national law of each State Member to where the 
data is shared, or the national law of a third country.61  
Alongside with these teams, that receive and reply to legal data requests, other internal 
stakeholders such as local legal counsels, privacy teams and police liaisons work together 
to ensure that this data sharing respects the applicable privacy laws.   
One of the stakeholders that has a determinant role in the communication with law 
enforcement authorities and competent authorities is the Police liaison62. The Police 
liaison is an internal stakeholder that is the main bridge, communication wise, between 
the company and the competent authorities. His/her main functions vary between liaising 
with the competent authorities, alongside with the companies Public Policy teams, to 
build up strategies, partnerships, establish processes of response, protocols and even 
webinars to instruct to the competent authorities on the use of the proper portals and to 
enlighten them the different types of data that the company holds.63 
The team structure and their internal processes are always evolving accordingly with 
the EU legal framework, public safety issues and also with the internal guidelines of the 
 
59 The GDPR has been in force on May 24, 2016 and it applies since May 25, 2018 as per Article 99 (1) 
and (2) of the GDPR. 
60 Uber BV is the data controller for the data of users on the European Economic Area, the United Kingdom 
and Switzerland and is has the Headquarters on the Netherlands; Facebook as their headquarters in Europe 
in Dublin, Ireland, being therefore the controller Facebook Ireland Ltd. The national law of the country 
where the controller has their Headquarters regulates the data. 
61 Even though our study will not focus on the data transfers of EU based companies with third countries 
or international organizations, it is important to briefly refer that on this matter the GDPR on Article 44 and 
Article 45 generally allows these data transfers to occur if there is an adequate level of protection in the 
respective third country or internal organization. 
62 Also commonly named as “Outreach”. 
63Crime Stoppers International in 2018 announced a partnership with Uber, see https://csiworld.org/csi-
news/crime-stoppers-international-and-uber-partnership-announced.  In a global view, Uber as available 
on their website de different types of partnerships to promote safety 
https://www.uber.com/us/en/community/safety/ as also Twitter shares in their website a list of safety related 
partnerships, see https://about.twitter.com/en_us/safety/safety-partners.html.  
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company. One clear example of change regarding the workflow of the Law Enforcement 
Response Team specifically of Uber is that due to the current pandemic situation the 
Portal once dedicated only to legal data requests related to criminal offenses, has now an 










64 Uber’s portal name at the moment is “Uber Law Enforcement and Public Health Portal” 
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2.2. How does a company respect the Article 15 of the Directive when 
sharing third-party data with Law Enforcement Authorities? 
As we’ve previously mention, upon a receipt of a request for personal data, law 
enforcement authorities usually disclose the position of the data subject in the criminal 
investigation. On this point we will disregard minor crimes such as simple theft, credit 
card fraud among others and we will focus on serious crimes that because of their nature 
can pose a serious threat to individuals and public security.  
We will construct a hypothetical situation to serve as an example of the action on the 
company side: a taxi car-sharing company receives a data request regarding a homicide, 
law enforcement is requesting data regarding a subject that configures the figure of 
suspect, the company is able to identify the user and to share the requested information 
to law enforcement.    
On this sharing of data, the company acknowledges a user that represents a threat to 
the other users of the platform. Allowing this user to continue to use the platform and 
therefore putting other users in risk would put the company in an accountable situation. 
Therefore, the company removes the user of the platform, but does not inform the user 
the reason that led to this removal as it could jeopardize the ongoing criminal 
investigation.  
  Giving the example of the United Kingdom, the legal document used to request 
personal data, as a section regarding the disclosure to the data subject where it states: 
The subject of the request should not be given indication that this request has been made prior 
to consultation with the requesting officer. If (….) subsequently receives a request for a copy of 
this document under DPA for information, please contact the requesting officer prior to 
disclosure. Discloser of this request without authorization of the requester may constitute an 
offence under s82 of the Investigatory Powers Act 2016. 
As we previously conclude, the data after shared is being process for the purposes of 
the prevention, investigation, detection or prosecution of criminal offences or the 
execution of criminal penalties, including the safeguarding against and the prevention of 
threats to public security. Therefore, if the company would inform the data subject of the 
request of law enforcement, upon the moment when the request is received, this could 
jeopardize the criminal investigation. Depending on the national law of each member 
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state, the company, after authorization from the law enforcement authorities, will disclose 
to the subject that a personal request has been made. 
In these situations, the data subject observes his/her right of access clearly restricted, 
especially the right of access as stated on Article 15(1)(c) of the GDPR.   
As we’ve previously concluded, the Article 23(1)(d) allows this restriction, 
consequently the data subject can see his/her right of access restricted in two sides: by the 
company, as will not communicate that the data has been requested complying with 
restriction of the GDPR and by the Law Enforcement authority, if this assesses to restrict 
the right of access, based on Article 15 of the LED. 
When the right of access is restored, the company with authorization of the law 
enforcement authority can disclose the data request to the user and the data subject can 
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Conclusion 
The material scope of the GDPR and the LED, as we’ve mention through our study, 
plays definitely a main role on the difference of the level of protection given to the data 
subject in both the regulation and the directive. On the LED side we observe that the data 
subject rights tend to shrink more than in the GDPR, justified with the purpose of the 
processing under the LED, however we were also able to see that the data subject is 
entitled ,when the restrictions occur, to safeguard measures and mechanisms to exercise 
his/her rights. 
The main new subject we wanted to bring to analyse was the sharing of personal data 
between private companies and third parties, specifically with law enforcement 
authorities, settling that both laws in different stages of the processing apply to this data 
communication and also demonstrating how principles of Law are taking into 
consideration in a practical sense. Furthermore, we’ve showed that the right of access on 
the course of the data sharing can be restricted, not only in the LED side but also in the 
GDPR creating a simultaneous double restriction.  
We believe we’ve demonstrated the importance of the regulation of the personal 
subject data, especially in a new era where personal data is more and more collected and 
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